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1 A longer version of this paper, with extensive literature review and additional results is forthcoming in the 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, August 2006.      1   
Milk Money and Intra-Household Bargaining:  Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk 
Sales from Northern Kenya 
 
  Many agricultural development projects include components to strengthen marketing 
channels for communities where large proportions of output are consumed at home. Opening 
these communities to markets is generally seen as improving the prospects for growth. But as 
market institutions develop, new social norms and rules must be mediated with existing cultural 
institutions.   
In this study, we investigate the impact of new market opportunities on Gabra nomadic 
pastoralists living in an arid climate in northern Kenya. The Gabra have recently experienced 
growth of milk marketing opportunities, and this change has caused a renegotiation of 
intrahousehold arrangements that affect households’ location and migration decisions. 
Among the Gabra, husbands traditionally decide where to locate the household. Households 
migrate frequently, as high rainfall variability requires moving livestock in search of pasture.  
Wives traditionally manage milk production and marketing. To sell milk, women walk to the 
small market towns of the study area.  
These traditional roles give husbands and wives competing interests as to household 
locations. Wives can sell milk more easily if they are located near the towns. Husbands may have 
interests in keeping the household farther away. We explore this decision in the pages that 
follow. 
We treat the household’s location decision as a bargaining game. Tradition essentially 
confers upon the husband “first mover” status, as he gets to choose the location. The wife then 
chooses how much milk to market in town. Households may react to new milk marketing 
opportunities in three ways. First, in the cooperative approach, the husband and wife make joint 
decisions on migration and milk marketing to maximize household welfare. Second, in the    2   
traditional solution, the husband continues to make migration decisions without considering the 
impact on milk marketing. Finally, in the contested solution, the husband views his wife’s use of 
milk markets with trepidation, as milk marketing allows a wife to expand her individual 
opportunities and potentially to expand her private consumption at the expense of household 
consumption.  In this case, a husband may exploit his first mover status to limit his wife’s ability 
to market milk. We formally model these outcomes below and then empirically investigate the 
pattern of household decision-making, using panel data from Gabra pastoral households. 
 
Description of the Data 
  This study uses longitudinal data gathered in two areas of Marsabit District, Kenya 
(Chalbi and Dukana). The sampling methodology used in this study was similar to a transect. 
Enumerators moved between the main towns of the study area, interviewing herders at nomadic 
camps along the way. The retrospective questionnaire recorded information for each three-month 
season of the years 1993-1997.  ( See Table 1.) 
For each period, households reported the walking time from their base camp to the 
nearest market town. Households also reported income sources, average daily milk production, 
and total milk sales per period.   Almost all income is derived from livestock and livestock 
products.  Full income was the equivalent of $0.61 per person per day in Chalbi and $0.38 in 
Dukana. Milk sales accounted for 11% of household cash income on average in Chalbi and 14% 
in Dukana. The majority of households (Chalbi 67%; Dukana 86%), sold milk during one or 
more seasons examined.  
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Models of Household Decision Making 
 
We develop three models of intra-household decision making that correspond to different 
decision making scenarios.  In each model, household members must decide how much milk to 
sell and where to locate the household.  The location decision is made at the start of a period, 
along with a milk marketing plan. Milk marketing occurs through multiple round trips to the 
nearest town throughout the period.  The temporal nature of the decisions allows the husband 
“first mover” status.  
Cooperative Decision Making 
In this model, the household decides on location and milk sales in a cooperative manner.  The 
outcome maximizes the joint (and separable) household utility function.  Individual utility is an 
increasing and concave function of consumption.  Total household utility is obtained by 
summing the utility of the husband and the wife. Consumption is defined as a household good 
that is shared proportionally by the husband and wife according to the weights α  and  α − 1 . 
Thus, the husband’s utility is Uh(c)=ln(α·c)  and the wife’s utility is Uw(c)=ln((1-α)·c).  Total 
household utility is defined as:  
(1)  ) ) ((1 ln ) ( ln c c ) c ( U ⋅ − + ⋅ = α α         
Total household consumption (c) includes milk consumed by household members and 
goods purchased with the income from milk sold.  The value of milk in home consumption can 
be viewed as the numéraire good so that the relative value of goods purchased by milk sales to 
the value of milk in home consumption is defined byθ .  Total milk production is m, and the 
quantity of milk sold is represented by s. Total consumption available to the household is 
represented as c=(m-s)+θ·s.    4   
  Milk markets are located in towns, and the distance to them is d.  The labor to market 
milk is an increasing function of milk sales and distance from town. Assume the labor cost of 
milk marketing can be represented by a multiplicative specification with a parameter 
1 ω assigning a parametric weight on milk marketing labor.  Thus the disutility of milk marketing 
labor effort can be represented by  d s 1 ⋅ ⋅ −ω .  
  Towns also are the centers of amenities, such as health centers, schools, bars and 
restaurants, public security, and markets. Settling farther from town provides disutility by 
reducing access to these amenities.  Assume the household shares the amenities and household 
members agree on the weight to the benefits provided by town-based amenities, 2 ω .  However, 
other herders also desire proximity to town. This reduces the quality of rangeland close to town 
and thus increases the labor necessary for herding, at a disutility weight of  3 ω .  We specify this 
disutility component as an inverse function of distance to reflect the gradient of grazing pressure 
around a fixed point of the town.  We represent these two countervailing influences that bring 












  The household solves the following problem. 
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Thus, in the cooperative model, the two decisions are made simultaneously. Households 
choose the distance from town as a decreasing function of milk sales.  Households choose milk 
sales as a decreasing function of distance.   
The Traditional Model 
In this model, we assume that the husband makes the location decision without 
considering how this influences milk sales. His first mover status is granted by reference to 
cultural precedent that gives him exclusive right to locate the household. The husband and wife 
each maximize their own utility. The husband decides where to locate. Taking this decision as 
given, the wife decides how much milk to sell. Husbands choose the household location based on 
the tradeoff between town-based amenities and increased labor for herding near town:   
(5)  () 23
1
ln ( )
d Max m s s d
d
αθ ω ω ⎛⎞ ⋅− + ⋅−⋅ −⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
       
while wives takes the distance as given and solve:           
(6)  () 1 ln (1 ) ( )
s Max m s s s d αθ ω −⋅− + ⋅−⋅ ⋅       
Note that equations (5) and (6) allocate the components included in equation (2) to either 
the husband or wife and the summation of (5) and (6) reproduces (2). The first order necessary 
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This model indicates that distance is determined independently of milk sales and milk 
sales are a decreasing function of distance.  Assuming sales are non-zero, contrasting equation 
(3) to equation (7) indicates that distance from town will be higher under the traditional model 
than the cooperative model.  By contrast, equations (4) and (8) respectively imply a lower level 
of milk sales in the traditional model compared to the cooperative model.   
The Contested Model 
In this model, we allow for the husband to understand that the introduction of milk marketing has 
created a new decision-making context.  However, rather than moving to a cooperative outcome 
as described above, he views this new opportunity as a threat:  Milk marketing allows his wife to 
convert milk into income that she controls. The husband realizes that his power as first mover 
allows him leverage to manipulate his wife’s milk sales.  Assume that some fraction of the milk 
sales income, η, is devoted to the household consumption bundle, while the remainder (1-η) is 
under the wife’s control for her private consumption.  The husband’s consumption is 
() ms s α θη ⋅− + ⋅ ⋅ while the wife’s is  ( ) (1 ) ms s αθ − ⋅− + ⋅ ; she receives both the value of the 
milk for household consumption and that which enters her private consumption. As the milk 
sales lead to less milk in shared consumption and more available for the wife’s exclusive 
consumption, the husband may have an interest in reducing her incentive to sell milk.  The 
husband’s first mover status is reflected in this problem by replacing s with s
* which represents 
the wife’s best response function. Other than this difference in notation, the components of 
equation (1) are allocated to the respective decision makers as shown in equations (9) and (10).   
 
The husband solves:  
(9)  ()
** 3
2 ln ( )
d
Max m s s d
d
ω
αθ η ω ⋅−+ ⋅ ⋅ −⋅ −           7   
while the wife solves:  
(10) () 1 ln (1 ) ( )
s Max m s s s d αθ ω −⋅− + ⋅−⋅ ⋅       
  We solve this problem recursively.  We begin with the wife’s maximization problem in 
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As always, milk sales are a decreasing function of distance.  In this model, assuming the 
term in brackets in equation (13) is greater than zero so that a positive distance results and so 
1 ≠ ⋅θ η , distance increases as s
* increases.  The comparison of the three models is summarized 
in table 2. 
  The milk sales variable should always be decreasing in distance.  The distinction between 
the three models depends on the sign and significance of the milk sales parameter in the distance 
equation.  These results provide the foundation for the empirical estimations that follow. 
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Empirical Analysis  
In this section, we use observed values for the distance from town and the total amount of milk 
sold to investigate the relationship between these decisions. We estimate these two decision 
variables jointly.  Denoting the distance from town decision by d, the milk sales decision by s, 
γ and  β as parameters to be estimated, X as matrices of exogenous variables, and u as bivariate 
normally distributed disturbance terms, the following two-equation system is defined: 
(14) 
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  The parameter of interest is  s γ in the distance equation.  A negative and significant result 
is consistent with the cooperative model. A result not significantly different from zero is 
consistent with the traditional model.  Finally, a positive and significant result is consistent with 
the contested model.   
The simultaneous equation specification (14) nests the three models introduced above. 
We model the two decisions as taking place jointly within a given season.   
A series of issues emerge when attempting to estimate this system of equations.  Because 
both dependent variables are by construction non-negative and censored at zero, we use full 
information maximum likelihood estimation of a bivariate tobit system. Separate models are 
estimated for Chalbi and Dukana.   
  Due to the longitudinal nature of the panel data, there may be underlying household 
specific characteristics that influence distance and milk sales decisions.  If not controlled for, the 
presence of such characteristics will lead parameter estimates to be inconsistent.  Therefore, a 
time invariant household specific fixed effect is controlled for by creating a matrix recording the 
means of household specific variables for all time periods observed and simulated full    9   
information maximum likelihood (SFIML) methods are used to control for a household specific 
random effect that is uncorrelated with the observed means. (Gourieroux and Monfort 1993).   
We include lagged dependent variables in the regression.  Distance remains the same in 
consecutive periods in the majority of cases and milk sales tend to occur in consecutive seasons. 
Including lagged dependent variables allows us to hold constant the outcomes of past decisions 
and focus attention exclusively on any changes to the two variables of interest in the current 
period.    
To resolve the identification problems, we include indicators of whether a raid occurred 
anywhere in the rangelands during the period and the number of pack camels owned by the 
household in the distance equation.  All else equal, a raid should cause households to move 
closer to town for security, while increased access to pack camels allows a household to settle 
further from town.  We also use the husband’s age, but not the wife’s age, in the estimation of 
the distance equation. Men are responsible for herding and their age influences the distance 
decision due to the impact on their labor effort.   
To identify the milk sales equation, we constructed a variable that records the average 
value of milk sold by other households in the sample for a given study site in the period.  As 
women generally walk the long distance to town and back after joining others from nearby base 
camps, we expect this variable to be positively related to sales: all else equal, more sales will 
occur when there is greater likelihood of walking companions.  In addition, we use exclusion 
restrictions based on the age of the female to identify milk sales levels.  We expect that younger 
women will be less likely to sell milk, as child care activities at home make daylong absences 
from the camp difficult and walking to town carrying young children is more strenuous.      10   
  The results for the endogenous parameters satisfy the coherency condition in all results 
presented.  The coefficient on milk sales in the distance estimation is positive and significant in 
all versions of the model estimated, thereby providing results consistent with the contested model 
of the household.  As expected, the coefficient on distance in the milk sales estimation is 
negative.  As distance increases, milk sales decrease.  The quantitative impact can be seen by 
conducting a numeric simulation of estimation results at sample means to generate elasticities.  
The elasticity of distance with respect to milk sales is 0.1 in Dukana and 0.2 in Chalbi.  The 
elasticity of milk sales with respect to distance is -2.8 in Dukana and -3.7 in Chalbi.  Distance is 
relatively inelastic to milk sales, but milk sales are highly elastic in response to distance. Using 
these elasticities and information about the sample means, we can calculate that a one liter 
increase in milk sales corresponds to a 7% increase in predicted distance from Dukana (34 
minutes further) and a 1% increase from Chalbi (3 minutes further).  A one hour increase in 
distance corresponds to a 31% reduction in predicted milk sales in Dukana (9 shillings) and a 
72% reduction in Chalbi (304 shillings).    While the impact of milk sales on distance is 
statistically significant and positive, the elasticities indicate that the quantitative impact is not all 
that large, suggesting husbands may not move all that much further out in response to increased 
milk sales.  However, as seen by the results for the elasticities of the milk sales equation, it does 
not take a large change in distance to have a relatively large impact on milk sales.  The fact 
remains that husbands are moving, albeit not far, in the opposite direction from what a 
cooperative model would predict.   
One alternative explanation is that the positive coefficient for milk sales in the distance 
equation could reflect cooperative behavior, if a move further from town increases milk 
production, thus increasing the availability of milk to sell. We estimate milk production using    11   
fixed effects and find no significant relationship to distance in Chalbi.  In Dukana, milk 
production decreases as distance to town increases up to fourteen hours away from town.  In 
short, the data do not support the idea that husbands are trying to maximize milk production by 
locating so far from towns.  
 
Conclusion 
The results are consistent with a contested model of household decision-making.  Men appear to 
be making decisions about the distance from town in order to limit wives’ milk sales.  This result 
is consistent with the notion that men resist the ability of their wives to move into the market 
domain.  While there may be benefits to increased milk marketing, men seem reluctant to 
facilitate this increase, possibly because they do not gain the benefits.  A related explanation is 
that men may choose to limit milk marketing simply to control women’s access to cash income 
and to town.   
  Is this contestation a good thing or a bad thing for overall household welfare?  We do not 
have the data to adequately address this issue.  Some studies indicate that income in women’s 
control is more likely than men’s income to be spent on goods for children .This would suggest 
that children’s welfare will increase when women earn income from milk sales.  On the other 
hand, by selling milk, women are also reducing the amount of milk available to the household, 
though potentially increasing caloric availability.  The literature on pastoral sedentarization finds 
a clear link between child malnutrition and lack of access to milk.  Thus, the impact on children 
is ambiguous.  
What we can say is that husbands and wives are responding to the new opportunities for 
milk marketing in a way that appears non-cooperative.  While the verbal description most often    12   
encountered in our field work matches the traditional model, the empirical evidence suggests the 
most appropriate way to understand the process is one of contestation.  Husbands appear to be 
using their traditional control over migration patterns to reduce wives sales. Apparently, they do 
not view the benefits they are getting from milk marketing as large enough to move towards a 
more cooperative model of decision making.  Wives are asserting that their traditiona right over 
milk management extends to this new setting.  This finding suggests that the introduction of 
market opportunities for goods that are traditionally home consumed may meet with resistance 
within the household.   
This study provides an intuitive and straightforward way of understanding how 
households react to new market opportunities when there is a gendered division of labor.  As 
development strategy increasingly relies on using markets to accelerate development (USAID 
2004; World Bank 2001), we suggest that policy makers should recognize the potential for intra-
household contestation over production decisions in the advent of new market opportunities. 
While much remains to be understood about the dynamics of response to new market 
opportunities, this study suggests that intrahousehold renegotiations may be difficult.  
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Distance to town (hours walk)  5.12  4.78 
 
8.27       8.22 
Value of Milk Sales   420.11  856.39  29.27     70.05 
Milk Production (liters per day)  
 
5.21  4.41  3.71       2.19 
Herd size (TLU) 
 
42.67  31.13  18.66       6.84 
Household  size (Adult Equivalents) 
 
5.04  2.17  4.68       1.77 
Percent or periods satellite camp used  47.71  49.98 
 
43.82     49.63 
Rainfall over past six months (mm)  58.39  42.09 
 
65.53     47.57 
Long Rains  0.27  0.45 
 
0.25       0.43 
Short Rains  0.24  0.43 
 
0.25       0.43 
Food aid deliveries (tons)   72.37  88.97 
 
65.22     85.74 
Age of oldest male in household  47.13  14.33 
 
53.12     12.09 
Age of oldest female in household 
 
36.84  13.24  36.50     10.04 
Number of Observations  677  980 
 
 










Cooperative   Traditional  Contested 
Distance Variable 
 
Decreasing in s  Not a function of s Increasing  in  s
*  
Milk Sales Variable  Decreasing in d Decreasing  in  d Decreasing  in  d 
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Distance  Milk Sales (x10
-3) 
Milk sales  3.16611 ***      
( 1.02678)         
   3.70025 *** 
(0.25908) 
 
Distance    -0.658005            
(0.597104)           
 -0.686938  *** 
(0.250100) 
No.  pack camels  -0.597525         
(0.700377)        
   -0.148756 
(0.341006) 
 
Raid dummy  -0.00467 
(0.080205)        
   -0.157237 
(0.678321) 
 
Age Male  -1.60016 ***    
(0.405667)        





-2)  0.0481240   *    
(0.0279672)      






   1.21607              
(1.31930)             
 1.05392 
(0.66353) 
Age Female    0.759154             





-2)    -0.0459006          
(0.0288405)         
 -0.029279 
(0.072929) 
Constant  12.2803             
(10.7371)          
-17.8559  **        
( 8.16485 )         




Distance last period  0.458494 ***    
(0.0357006)      
0.200812              
(0.158266)           
0.458468 *** 
(0.0553490) 
-0.117103  ** 
(0.058656) 
Sales last period   0.951257  **     
(0.435340)        
0.196624             





Herd size (TLU) (x10
-1)  -0.9902040       
(0.822048)        
 1.45691               





Household size (adult 
equivalents) 
1.97146  **       
(0.879839)        
 3.18593              
(2.47187)           
-1.27893 
(1.01103) 
0.346612  ** 
(0.162650) 
Food aid  (x10
-2)  -1.14117 ***    
(0.414120)        
 1.08195             





Rainfall (mm past six 
months) (x10
-2) 
-0.099194         
(0.546279)        
 0.704351             





Long rains   -2.64453 ***    
(0.985721)        
 7.33979   *          
(3.97177)            
-0.967397   * 
(0.526434) 
0.774157  ** 
(0.400687) 
Short rains   -1.43078           
(0.955378)        
 7.22790   *          
(4.25104)         




Random Effect scaling 
term 
-2.85106 ***    
(0.453921)        
 1.63210  **         
(0.782943)           
2.00160 *** 
(0.400190) 
1.80756  ** 
(0.774466) 
Sigma    7.54423 ***     
(0.270483)        
4.95976                




(0.376620)    15   
Covariance  11.0787               
(25.2866)                     
-7.61454 *** 
(1.15797) 
Male Age Joint  
2
) 2 ( χ   25.1 ***    12.3 ***   
Female Age Joint
2
) 2 ( χ     4.5    5.8   * 
Household Fixed Effect 
Joint
2
) 4 ( χ  
23.3 ***  7.2  15.5 ***  20.1 *** 
Log Likelihood  3646.91  2093.81 
No. observations  931  632 
Significance:   *.10, **.05, ***.01 
  